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Tremendous problems concerning legality or il1egality， post war Germany 
has been faced with to solve， emanated from the Nazi political process， as 
its criticism showed us. One of the most odious problems is grudge informer 
cases. Here， in these cases people who actually wished to drive out their 
personal enemies， or to get rid of unwanted spouses informed the Nazi r巴gime，
or local party leaders against their victims for their spiteful or provocative 
remarks about the Nazi leaders. These cases are， so to speak， a core of such 
problems. For after the collapse of Nazi regime people， having uti1ized such 
a means of information， are conceived as being unlawful for their acts， and 
often found gui1ty， accordingly punis1un巴ntto these offenders is an urgent task 
十 Thisis a surnmary of the author's Japanese artic1e published under the same titIe， 
though a litle bit modified in its content. Th巴original ar託凶t討ic1巴constitutes a part of t託h渇ec∞01崎
lecはt巴吋dpa却p巴r凶s(令er回n剖出1此必t託i凶tl巴吋d:“ Prob1e叩ms0ぱflaw andμu江ris叩:pr印ude阻nc印6刊
Ts叩un江m路副etofor his 70f偽hb悩ir抗吋thdayc∞omm巴moration. As to the content it constitutes a part of the 
author's study:“Validity of law and fidelity to law in the changing mass societyぺ An
artic1e cited below too has been writt巴nfor this purpose. 
The fol1owing abbreviations are used throughout the article: CA for Court of Appeal= 
Ob号dandesgericht，KG for Kammergericht， CCL for Control Council Law=Kontroll-
ratsgesetz， SJZ for Suddeutsche JuristerトZeitung，DRZ for Deutsche R巴chts-Zeitschrift，
MDR for Monatsschrift fur Deutsch巴sRecht， HLR for Harvard Law Review. 
* Professor of Jurisprudence， Osaka University. 
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for Germany and occupation authorities to rebuild the rule of law there， while 
these informers themselves considered and argued their acts lawful and 
admirable under the Nazi regime when at the height of its power.1) 
This legal issue becomes more complicated when we note that several 
formulas for its sett1ement are possible. Indeed， there are at least three for欄
mulas according to the historica1 exp巴rienceof the occupation. The first is 
the formu1a of retroactive legislation which aimes at to punish informer and 
the Control Council Law (CCL) is the typical one. The second is the formula 
of a reference to a higher law to review the Nazi laws which informer pr巴tended
to rest on. The third is the formula of an interpretation and application of 
the German Criminal Law (1871) for the same purpose. We may cal each of 
them the retroactive legislation， the judicial review to a material extent and 
the interpretation and application of the German criminal law. As a matter 
of fact the tlurd formula has been brought realization in American occupied 
area， while the first has been applied retrospectively by German courts under 
the delegation of each of也氏eauthorities (English， Soviet and French) in 
their occupied areas. So far as these formulas have arisen from the necessity 
of set1ement of the lega1 issue left by the Nazi political process， and of improve幽
ment of Germany in its legal political system， itis no wonder that each of them 
has been faced with hot discussions - criticism and anticr悩cismー. The 
discussion， we may well find， raises the question how to deal with fidelity to 
law and validity of law besides of the question of possibilities of formulas said 
above. 1 shall attempt to analyze a litle c10sely the meaning of fidelity to 
law and validity of law by laying a special emphasis on the examination into 
a dicussion on the third formula. For this purpose the decision of Court 
of Appeal (CA) Bamberg seems to afford the key to an understanding of this 
lSSU巴.
The CA Bamberg in its decision of July 27， 1949， which raised the severe 
controversy， dealt with a case as follows: 
“In October， 1944， the defendent who during her husband's long absence 
on military duty since 1940 had turned to other men and who wished to get 
rid of him， reported his remarks to the localleader of the Nazi party (Orts司
1) See Arthur Kaufmann， Das Unrechtsbewusstsein in der Schu1dlehre des Strafrechts， 
1949， whlch gives a briliant analysis as to the outline and depth of the informer problem as 
a whoI巴.
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gruppenleiter). Whi1e under travel orders on a reassignment， he paid a short 
visit to his wlie during the single day. At this time he made disparaging remarks 
to her about Hitler and other Nazi leaders. He also said itwas too bad Hitler 
had not met his end in the assassination attempt that had occurred on July 
20， 1944. She denounced him to the local leader as above， observing that a 
man who would say a thing like that does not deserve to live. The content of 
his remarks was handed to the circ1e leader (Kreisleiter). The result was a 
trial of the husband by a Mi1itary Tribunal. At the trial she gave evidence on 
oath， and the husband was sentenced to death. After more than one week of 
imprisonment， he was sent to the front again， consequently he was not executed". 
After the collapse of the Nazi regime， the wlie as wel1 as the judge who had 
sentenced her husband， was brought to trial. According to the decision of 
a German court of last resort in cr・iminalcas巴s，that is， CA Bamberg， the sen-
tencing judge was not-gui1ty， but the wlie was gui1ty under Artic1e 239 of the 
German Crimitial Code of 1871， for the intentiona1 and unlawful deprivation 
of another's liberty (Fei11eitsberaubung， Frmeitsentziehung)， because she uti1ized 
out of choice - right - Nazi laws to bring the death or free punishment of 
her husband. This is an out1ine of the decision.2l 
Let me summarize the detai1 of the d巴cisionby citing a few crucial points. 
1. Condemnation of the defendant for a principal by indirection. 
Certainly she offered a chance to the local leader to arrest her husband. 
But she didn't it direct1y， but indirectly. What is re1evant here， isthat 
she unlawfully deprived her hl1sband of his liberty in an indirect way， 
that is， as a principal by indirection (mittelbarer Tater). 
2. Validity of Nazi laws. During the period of the Nazi government 
when at the height of its power， German courts had to .try the acts or 
utternaces of people which fel1 under a provision of A Law Against 
Malicious Attacks on the State and the Party and for the Protection of 
the Party Unliorm Law of Dec. 20， 1934， and Artic1e 5 of A Statute 
Creating a Particular Criminal Law in War Time， Law of Aug. 1， 1938 
(Heimtueckegesetz und Kriegssonderstrafrecht). There is no room. 
for doubt that such laws with their provisions were“highly iniquitous 
2) B巴schlusvon 7. 27. 1949， Ober1andesg巴:richt(OLG=CA) Bamberg， SJZ， 1950， 
S. 208f. DRZ， 1950， S.302f. NJW， 1950， S.35f. 
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laws (grob unbillige Gesetze). They were felt to be terror laws (Schre司
ckengesetze) by the great majority of the German people， because of 
their severe penalties which offered the possibility of cruel punishment 
in the particuIar case. They cannot， however， be held to be laws vio-
lating natural law (naturrechtswidrige Gesetze).For they did not 
order people to take positive acts which necessarily would be pr叫lI-
bitted by divine law or human law according to the opinion of al 
cultur叫lyminded nations， but ordered under penalty merely to keep 
s丑ent."
3. No justification for the act of defendant-wife. She reported her 
husband's utterances by using the right of information which is given 
al members of the state， to which， however， does not correspond any 
duty. ln this respect she is different from the sentencing judge of the 
Nazi Military Court who had been under the special status as being 
subjected to the state power (besond巴reG巴waltunterworfenheit). One 
who intentionally and despite of his knowledge of the fact that his act 
of information would necessary cause a frightful predicament to the 
informed， dare to do it， isblamable for his act，“especially in such cases 
when the utterances of the informed correspond to the truth， inaccor-
dance with the views of decency and morals (die Au宵assungvon Sitte 
und Anstand) prevailing widely within the G巴rmanpeople even at the 
t也記 ofNazi government." From this point of view such act is natur叫ly
unjust (Unrecht) and yet unlawful (rechtswidrig) to the extent of Art. 
239. 
After al it is clear that the special emphasis of this decision is laid 
on the value standard or standard for decision making as “the sound 
conscience and sense of justice of al de田nthuman b巴ings"(das B出ig噌
keits-und Gerechtigkeitsempfinden aler anstandig Denkenden) which 
should be mentioned later. 
This decision has provoked so hot discussion that it has not on1y been 
noised at once throughout the scientific wor1d of law in this country， but later 
in the abroad too. The matter like this is not surprising， since the d巴cision
touched on the fundamental problems in regard to fidelity to and validity of 
the Nazi laws. But before getting into these problems， something important 
does seem to me to be explained in this case. Per・hapsthere are the following 
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points so long as we can c1assify it. First of al， the informer's act fals under 
Art. 239 of German Criminal Code for the unlawful deprivation of another's 
liber匂 inthe form of principa1 by indirection. How to consider then the act 
unlawful is the next problem. 
Accor・dingto the argument of the defendant明 ife;her・actis the justificable 
act as being rested on the Nazi laws. 1f so， itrnight become lawful， accordingly 
she might become not-guilty. 8uch plea of the justificable act (in other words， 
fidelity to the Nazi laws) has been often made by defendants in defending 
themselves on trial. The court， on the contrary， decided her act unlawful. 
Why then the court was able to decide in such a way? Certainly， Nazi laws 
W巴reto be held valid laws to the fonnal extent. 80 far as their social adequacy 
is concerned， however， they were iniquitous laws. This fact was plainly pointed 
out by the decision. Moreover， we may imply the basic views und巴rlyingthe 
decision as follows: A great llumber of German people st出 maintainedthe 
views of decency and morals even under the pressure of Nazi govermnent. 
Their views rooted in the historical tradition of German society played a role 
as a conventional morality3) (Dr. Benn & Peters) to judge the social adequacy 
of Nazi laws. Viewing from this perspective， Nazi laws said above lacked the 
social adequacy， accordingly wrong to the material extent as Prof. v. Weber 
showed us. Thus the informer's act is not to b巴helda justificable act. The 
last problem is concerning to her responsibility. 
8he had no duty， but merely right of information. And yet that she was 
立1intentioned to bring the death or free punishment of her husband is quite 
obvious from her observation that a man who wou1d say a thing like that does 
not deserve to live. 8he ought， therefore， tohave been conscious of the fact 
that her act intentionaIIy taken was against the popular views of decency and 
morals as deeply rooted in the tradition of German society. If so， naturally 
she cannot dodge her responsibility. 
II Problem of choice among possible formuIas for the purpose of 
punishment 
Now let us turn to see how this decision has been reviewed by different 
scholars in each different countries. 1n Germany it is easily conceivable as a 
3) S.I.Benn and R.S.Peters， Social principles and the democratic state， 1959， P.59. 
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matte1' of fact that since the decision has 1'aised complicated issues of legality 
01' illegality of defendant's act， the concept of a p1'incipal by indi1'ect， unlaw-
fulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) and 1'esponsibility has come into main questions. 
As to the concept of a p1'incipal by indirect， this is not the first deci8ion which 
applied this concept. The1'e a1'e seve1'al decisions in this 1'espect， like the 
Schwarzel case4) 01' Puttfa1'ken case 1'eviewed by late Prof. Radbruch5). This 
decision as well as the others， however， has brought scholars to a con宜ictof 
vi巴ws.Prof. R. Lange agreed with this view of the decision on the one hand， 
obse1'ving that it frankly accepted the concept of material unlawfulness (ma-
teriale Rechtswid1'igkeit) by applying the concept of a principal by indirect 
to this case.6) On the othe1' hand Prof. v. Webe1' was relatively critical upon 
the view of this 801't， ，P1'of. Welzel and D1'. Schemel we1'e plainly dissatisfied 
to it.7) 1 am sure that such a con:flict of views would be he1pful in awaking 
an attention to the basic p1'oblems of inte1'p1'etation of laws. But instead of 
going furthe1' technically in these respects 1 shall have to content myself with 
some b1'ief 1'ema1'ks on two points， that is， standa1'd fo1' evaluating info1'me1"s 
act and fo1'mula of settlement of the legal issue 1'esulting f1'om this case. 
The fi1'st point becomes c1ea1' when we note the argument of Prof. v. 
Weber. He a1'gued that the decision did not succeed to p1'ove the existence of 
intentional act， matte1's acco1'dingly would not have been helped ifit showed the 
act to be ethically blamed.8) The1'e would be a dange1' in this decision to 
punish immo1'al mind instead of legal l'・esposibility，if it 1'eached its height. 
It may safely be assumed that what is to be legally interp1'eted is mo1'aly 01' 
ethically judged and pe1've1'ted by judicial decision. And yet the moral standa1'd 
like the sound conscience and sense of justice of al1 decent human beings in困
volved in the decision， tosay with Dr. Schemel，9) lies just at the 1'oot of the 
dange1' of this so1't. Apa1't f1'om the judgement of 1'eality of this dange1'， it 
should be 1'ema1'ked at this point that to solve the puzzle of info1'me1"s 
4) Der Grundsatz“nullum crimen sine lege" wurde das Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 10 
nicht ver1etzt， Judgement of June 21， 1947， KG， DRZ， 1947， S.308 f. 
5) G. Radbruch， Gesetzlich巴sUnrecht und ubergesetzliches Recht， SJZ， 1946， 
S. 105 f. 
6) R. Lange， Anmerkung zum Beschluss， OLG Bamberg， SJZ， 1950， 209. 
7) H. Welzel， Anmerkung zum Beschluss， OLG Bamberg， DRZ， 1950， S. 303f. 
8) H. von Weber， Anmerkung zum Beschluss， QLG Bamberg， NJW， 1950， S. 35 f. 
9) H. Schemel， Anmerkung zum Besch1us， OLG Bamberg， NJW， 1950， S. 515. 
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responsibi1ty man can not help to examine Nazi laws which offer the legal 
basis of his motivation and the supralegal standard which is available to evaluate 
the act and legal basis involved in this case. But， to examine the standard 
for eva1uation it is again necessary to consider several formulas said above. 
Surely these points here are c10sely connected with each other. 1n this sense， 
a discuミsionheld by two leading scholars in England and America， that is， Prof. 
H. L. A、Hartand Lon L. Fuller， may make these points plainer. Despite of 
arguing on the common ground that the formula of retroactive legislation 
should be chosen even the case like the CA Bamberずscase， they are different 
in the reasoning of this formula as well as the standard for evaluation. Let 
me summarIZe their argue攻lentsby citing each different emphasis laid in them. 
What Prof. Ha1't isanxious to a1'gue is that those who may hold the 
positivistic view of law (1aw is law) a1'e able， at the same time， tooffer“the 
moral criticism of institutions". So far as this a1'gument is concerned， heought 
to be fundamentally of the CA Bamberg's opinion， except the judgement of 
possible fo1'mula. 
1n his artic1e 
however， he conceived of the opinion of the decision as to the fact in 
some different meaning as follows: “The court of appeal to which the 
case ultimately came held that the wife was guilty of p1'ocuring the 
deprivation of her husband's libe1'ty by denouncing him to the German 
courts， even though he had been sentenced by a court for having violated 
a statute， since， to quote the words of the court， the statute “was 
cont1'ary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of al decent human 
beings."" This reasoning was followed in many cases which have been 
hailed as a tiumph of the doctrines of natural law and as signaling the 
overthrow of positivism. The unquali宣edsatisfaction with this result 
seems to me to be hysteria. Many of us might applaud the objective 
- that of punishing a woman fo1' an out1'ageously irnmoral act -but 
this was secured only by declaring a statute established since 1934 not 
to have the force of law， and at least the wisdom of this cou1'se must 
be doubted.10J" 
10) H. L. A. Hart， PositiVIsm and the separation of law and morals， HLR， vol. 1958， 
p. 619. 
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This is his facts analysis. According to this analysis the desision seems 
to consist of series of reasoning like: the standard of naturallaw→judicial 
review of Nazi laws to the mateial extent→nullification of these laws 
→伊丑tyof the defendant-明ifeas resu1ted from this invalidity. 
It follows then that the decision has been made according to the second 
formula of judicial decision besides of the third formula of interpretation 
and application of German criminallaw. But this analysis is not borne 
out by facts， as we have seen above. The ambiguity in his analysis， 
mainly due to the report of Harveard Law Reviewer， has been carefully 
criticized by Dr. Pappell). In the r問ec白en凶tmagni埠fic白er凶lt work 
Concept of Law" Prof. Hart has frankly accepted his criticism by 
saying the analysis cited above-to be “hypothetical" analysis.12) 
If now it may safely be affirmed that law is law， itwould be possible to 
say that wife's act as rested on the Nazi laws is lawful so that it means fidelity 
to law. Yet he has never taken the plunge of this sort. For the Uti1itarian 
viewpoint of， orthe empirical approach to law make him to consider the propo-
sition that勺awsmay be law but too evi1 to be observed."13) Thus Prof. Hart 
came to be consistent in his argument concerning two points， that is， the posi-
tivistic view of law (law is law) and the moral criticism of institutions. Here 
there is certainly a remarkable difference of his legal positivism from the ordinary 
type of legal positivism to the extremely formalistic extent in regad to the ac岨
ceptance of the moral criticism. 
In the former article Prof. Hart showed his idea on the informer's problem 
by mentioning to the choice of the two evils. “One was to let the woman go 
unpanished.- The other was to face the fact that if the woman were to be 
punished it must be pursuant to the introduction of a frankly retrospective law 
and with a ful consciousness of what was sacrificed in securing her punish・
ment in this way.14)" Here， he prefered the retrospective legislation from the 
Utilitarian viewpoint. In the later work， however， he seems to emphasize the 
1) Judgement of July 27， 1949， CA Bamberg， HLR， vol. 64， 1951， p.1006. H. O. 
Pappe， On the validity of judicial decisions in the Nazi era， The Modern Law Review， 1960， 
p.263. 
12) The concept of law， 1961， note 1， atp. 204. p. 255. 
13) Hart， Positivism (cited above)， p.620. 
14) Ibid， p.619. 
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necessity of social scientific investigation of immoral law - by means of the 
wider concept of law in contrast to the narrower concept of law _15)， instead 
of to go further into the problem of choice and retrospective legislation. Here 
is a slight change which would be caused by Dr. Pappe's criticism. 
In contrast with the arguement of Prof. Hart， Prof. Fuller has placed a 
special emphasis on two points， that is， the interpretation of publicity provided 
in the Nazi laws and the internal mora1ity， or inner morality of law. 
In his reply to Prof. Hart -“Positivism and fidelity to law" -Prof. 
Fuller， analyzing the meaning of Nazi laws in question， has showed us that 
what they provide to punish， is， fo1' instance， malicious utterances not made 
in private， but in public to be directed against the leadiIig personalities ofNazi 
party. But husband's rema1'ks to his wife are to be considered as private 
utterances as far as they were made private1y when he was home. By seeing 
such a great discrepancy of rule and fact in the result of “the interpretative 
principle"16) in force during Hit1er's government， he suggests us that husband's 
rema1'ks originaIly ought not to fal under these provisions. This is his facts 
analysis. 
On the other hand he has criticized the Nazi laws for having neglected 
the internal， or inner morality of law. Inner morality of law here is moral 
postulation as immanent within the framework of law which should be re-
ma1'ked and observed by people Iike legislators， judges， law practione1's inthei1' 
legislation and application of law.17) It should be stil1 rema1'kable at this 
point that Prof. W. Friedmann cals it“a minimum rationality of structu1'e" .18) 
“It is apparent that this monarch will never achieve even his own 
selfish aims until he is ready to accept that minimum self-restraint that 
wil1 create a meaningful connection between his words and his actions." 
“Here， aga担， it is apparent that if our monarch fo1' his own selfish 
advantage wants to create in his realm an戸hinglike a system oflaw he 
will have to pull himself together and assume sti1l another responsibility." 
“Justice in the administration of the law， which consists in the Iike 
15) Hart， the concept of law， p.204 f. 
16) L. L. FulIer， Positivism and fidelity to law -A reply to Prof. Hart， HLR， voI. 1958， 
p.655. 
17) Ibid， p.645 f. p. 659. 
18) W. Friedmann， Legal thω'ry， 4th ed.， 1960， p.31. 
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treatment of like cases."19) 
In this context Prof. Fuller seems to give inner morality of law two roles， 
that is， to help the normal functioning of judicial process while to function 
itself as a value standard to criticize unlawful law， or legal wrong under the 
abnormal situation. Emphasizing on the latter role， he doesn't hesitate to deny 
to the legal wrong like the Nazi laws in question. From this acspet of the 
matter too he has α託icize~ Prof. Hart for having ignored such a inner morality 
of law. 
"Where on~ would have been most tempted to say，“ This is 80 evil 
it cannot be a law，"" one could usually have said instead，“This thing 
is the product of a system so oblivious to the morality of law that it 
is not entitled to be called a law.""20) 
If we presumably trace his reply along the facts analysis and the argument 
of the inner morality of law， itmay well be said that he， indealing with th巴
ca8e， suggested us two formulas， atfirst the judicial review to the material extent 
(on the basis of inner morality of law) and then the punishment of wife under 
the application of German criminal law to be used. This suggestion is not 
so far from the general tendency expressed in the CA Bamberg's decision. 
In his conclusion， however， he has preferred the first formula of the retroactive 
legislation instead of the third formula (application of German criminallaw)， 
fo1' the purpose to“isolate a kind of c1eanup operation from the normal func-
tioning of the judicial process.21)" That is why he is 1'elatively different from 
P1'of.狂arfsidea， but they were on the ground of the same conclusion not-
withstanding. 
III Fidelity to and validity of Nazi Iaws 
The set1ement of the informer's problem by means of the judical p1'ocess 
and of the 1'etroactive legislation is originally confusable in their contents. 
For even the retroactive law needs the intervention of judicial process for its 
application on the one hand and the judicial process too， inthe application 
of German criminal law， often 1'elies upon the c1'eative interpretation said 
19) Fuller， op. cit. p. 644. 646. 
20) Ibid.， p.661. 
21) Ibid.， p.661. 
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above so that the judicial process makes German people to feel this application 
being a kind of retrospective application on the other hand. 
The CA Bamberg's decision， involving several issues and raising a serious 
controversy， a立eral， isnothing but the summary expression of importance to 
choose possible formulas. It is to deserve attention that the areas controlled 
under British， Soviet and French military governments where German COurtE 
came to be qualified to apply the retrospective laws， especially Control Council 
Law No. 10， are continuously followed by the trend of opinions to strongly 
oppose to their application on the ground of nulla poena sine lege， while the 
American occupied area where German courts were not qualified to apply such 
retrospective laws， but merely the German criminal law (1871)， are followed 
by the other type of opposite opinions to see this formula insu缶cient.22) Thus， 
whether to punish informer， or not， becomes an urgent problem， asProf. Hart 
showed in the case of choice of two evils. Looking at the informer's problem 
in its extremely inhuman character and in the extraordinarily abnormal 
situation， itwould not be unconceivable that the retrospective punishment to 
informer was preferred as an e宜ectivemeans to reestablish the rule of law and 
to realize the democratic values. 
To consider the problem of choice among these formulas， however， 
we need to take account of two points， namely， the difference of German 
andAnglo綱Americanlegal thinking， especially in dealing with the principle 
of nulla poena sine lege on the one hand and the difference of impli-
cation of end and means relations on the other. It should be， 1 
think， remarked from the latter point of view， when Prof. W. Friedmann 
said the solution of this problem being nothing but a product of the 
political compromise.23) 
1 have endeavored to show how the Nazi outlook of the world was com-
pletely criticized and the plea of the justificable act made by informer was 
basically denied. On the contrary， we can not find the similar conc1usion as 
to the validity of Nazi laws. CA Bamberg in its decision accepted the fact 
2) H. von Weber， Das Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit in der Rechtsprechung， 
MDR， 1949， S.263 f. 
See aIso the author's Japanese articIe:“On the settIement of legal isues emanated 
form the Nazi political process and the standard for evaluating it" (prepared). 
23) 1ヲriedmann，Legal theory， 3rd ed. 1953， p.458. 
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that the Nazi laws enacted at 1934 and 1938 were conceived as high1y iniquitous 
laws under the great number of German people. But it did not declare them 
invalid. As we saw above， itis relatively a common way of reasoning of 
German courts to limit themselves merely to deal with the informer's respon-
sibility by avoiding to go further into the trouble matters of validity of Nazi 
laws. Why then they avoided to do it? If they retrospectively declared the 
Nazi laws invalid from the beginning of its enactment， itwould be easier for 
them to deny the p1ea of justi:ficable act of informer and to punish him as 
Prof. H. Coing remarked.24) It is， however， asa matter offact， hard to prevent 
the hopleess confusion arose as a result of nullification of the Nazi laws in 
question since such laws had become the legal basis for innumerable acts which 
were not always unlawful and punishable as such. 
It seems to come from the consideration of this sort that the post war 
decisions of German courts did not always to supply definite answer to this 
incredibly trouble matters of the validity of the Nazi laws， they were faced 
with. Naii laws enacted especial1y under the influence of the Nazi outlook 
of the world， let alone the laws of 1934 and 1938， has been natural1y abolished 
by the post war legislation of the occupying mi1itary government.25) As the 
legislation made here merely concerns with the invalidity of these laws in仕le
future， however， itappears that the legislation itself did not help to deny the 
plea of justificable act made by informer. 
In the light of these considerations， itseems possible to understand the 
meaning of五de1ityto law and validity of law on reffering to the decision of CA 
Bamberg as fol1ows. As an example 1 may cite a fami1ar question of“What 
makes law to va1id?" To answer this question it would be a possible way to 
refer to a formal structure of legal order itself. It fol1ows that if law is enacted 
in accordance with the formal procedure of enactment as required by legal 
order (particularly， constitution)， itis formal1y a law and valid within the 
formal， or logical sructure of legal order， asDr. Benn & Peters pointed OUt.26) 
It has a formal， or logical validity. To say with Prof. Hart， such a law is 
formal1y a va1id law， even though it might involves immoral elements in itself. 
24) H. Coing， Zur Frag巴derstrafrechtlichen Haftung der Richter fur die Anwendung 
naturrechtswidriger Gesetze， SJZ， 1947， S.62. 
25) See SJZ， 1946， S.20 f. 
26) S. 1. Benn and R. S. Peters， op. cit. p. 79. 
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This fact， however， doesn't mean that such a law is a law valid or e:fective in 
reality too， as he and Prof. Fuller， though from the 副長rentaspect of the 
matter， questioned it. For it is often the case that laws in enactment or appli-
cation， being deviated from the ordinary pattern of social action of people， 
are not observed by them. 
Dr. Benn & Peters has showed the importance of this contrast by 
c1assifying three main questions:“What criteria must a rule satisfy to 
be a valid law?" involyes“analysis of the formal structure of a legal 
system， and of the relation between norms of di:ferent levels of general圃
ity." “Why so people in fact obey the law?" or “What functions does 
law perform in a society?" are psychological or sociological questions. 
At last ‘明Thyought polpe、toobey the law?" is moral question.27) 
Among the c1assical scholars， we may cite merely M. Weber28) and 
K. Renner，29) M. Weber too pointed out the importance by c1asi-
fying two di宜erentapproaches to law， name1y， dogmatic (juristisch or 
rechtsdogmatisch) and sociological.“It is obvious that these two 
approaches deal with entire1y di:ferent problems and that their ''''objec-
tives"" cannot come directly into contact with one another. The ideal 
""legal order"" of legal theory has nothing with directly to do with the 
world of real economic conduct， since both exist on di宜erentlevels. 
One exists in the ideal realm of the “ought，"" while the other deals 
with the real world of the “is"". 1f it is nevertheless said that the 
econornic and the legal order are intimate1y related to one another， 
the latier is understood， not in the legal， but in the sociological sense， 
i.e.， as being empirically va1id. 1n this context“legal order'''' thus 
assumes a totally di:ferent meaning. It refers， not to be a set of norms 
of logically demonstrable correctness， but rather to a complex of actual 
determinants of actual human conduct. This point requires further 
consideration.' ， 
What the legal va1idity in reality (e:fectiveness of law) here means is that 
law valids in the reality of social relations， namely， it is actually 
27) Ibid.， p.58. 
28) M. Weber on law in economy and society， tras1. by M. Rheinstein， 1954， p.12. 
29) K. Renner， The institutions of Private law and their social functions， trans1. by 
A. Schwazschild， 1949， p.75 -ff. 
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observed by people in their action (fidlity to law) - whether voluntari1y by 
themselves， or compulsary by indirect means of judicial process. If so， itis 
hardly 1ikely that two Nazi laws with their provisions mentioned above do have 
the potential va1idity in reality. Thus， they do not give a su鼠cientreply to 
the question:“What do people in fact obey the law?" For they do lack in 
their social ad巴quacy. In this， itis almost conceivable that law is actual1y 
wrong， inextr百necases law might lack the very nature of law even though it 
might be formal1y a law， accordingly it has a formal or normative validity. 
The decision of CA Bamberg se巴msto suggest such a possibi1ty of reasoning. 
The key to the qestion in terms of wheth巴ra law is wrong in reality is to be 
found in the fact， whether it has a potencial validity in reality， inoth巴rwords， 
its social adequacy， or not. The p1ea of the defendanトwifethat she" did 
merely the justificable act， come to be hardly set up on this ground too. 
Nazi laws at stake， natural1y， were applied by Nazi Military Court. It 
is one of the typical cases at that time， inwhich her husband was sentenced 
under these laws. ln accordance with this fact that these laws applied， they 
seem to have had the validity in reality. Referring on the decision of CA 
Bamberg， however， these laws in fact lacked their social adequancy， cons巴-
quently the potential validity in reality. 
2. Sev巴ralstandards for evaluation 
Now we can return to the third， but main point:“Why ought people to 
obey the law?" As with the question:“Why do people in fact.ob巴ythe law?" 
one may obey the law， the other may not obey the law because it is adapted 
for the pattern of their action， or it is deviated from that pattern. “Whythen 
ought people to obey the law?" On what kind of basis for evaluation are 
we going to obey the law? ln other words， there must be the first considera-
tion in deciding what kind of satadard for evaluation should be sel巴ctedfor 
people to obey the law. Some laws lacked the potential validity in reality， 
as did the Nazi laws， for they were not based on the social adeql1acy. There 
is sti1 an unsolved question in tenns of how then we can find the standard for 
judging the existence of social adequancy. It is certainly possible to say， as
did Dr. Benn & Peters， that there is a difference of the question， "Why do 
people in fact obey the law?" and the question，“高Thyought people to obey 
the law?" It is， however， hard to deny a definit巴connectionbei 
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can we set up standards for evaluation? 
First of al， what appeal to us is the standard of higher law， in other words， 
naturallaw. It is also the same standard which Harvard Law Reviewer partly 
misreported as applied to the case of CA Bambe1'g， accordingly Professor 
Hart conceived as generally applied by German courts in their decisions. In 
the ear1y post war pe1'iod， this standard， asProfessor H. Rommen pointed 
out， has played the active 1'ole in l'巴spectto t1巴secondformula of judicial 1'eview 
to the material extent. But when the occupyirlg forces were coming to advance 
more concretely the course of punishment of local war criminals， the standard 
of naturallaw itself， being treated with in di宜erentways by different approaches， 
was so splitted off that it was divided into the opposite things， that is， natural 
law of justice or humanity and natural law of legal security 01' the principle of 
“nulla peona sine lege" on the ground of controversy on the application of 
CCL No.lO. While the fo1'mer placed the special emphasis on the realization 
of the democratic values， the latter resisted it on the side of the defense of the 
democratic values.30) It is the reality at that t泊lewhennaturallaw was implied 
and applied to such a contradictory extent. If so， there is a scarce possibility 
to accept natural law as the unquestionably certain standard for evaluation 
despite of the insistence on its general validity. Frankly speaking， natural 
law is brought into being on1y within the people in beli巴、ringit， asProfessor 
W. Friedmann mentioned.31) 
If we look for the standard in the wider scope of morality， howeve1'， 
besides of natural law， that is， pure morality， the1'e are two othe1' types of 
moralities. One is the inne1' morality of law， 01' internal mo1'ality of law which 
P1'of. Fuller showed us. The othe1' is morality being crystallized in the system 
of pe1'sonality and social action of people， the1'efo1'e being担visblyunder1ying 
and yet controlling the eve1'y day action of people. B1'iefly speaking， This is 
conventional mo1'ality， especially pointed out by Dr. Benn & Pete1's. It is 
also morality of the sam巴so1'twhich the decision of CA Bambe1'g called “the 
sound conscience and sense of justice of de∞nt human beings"，“decency and 
mo1'als" prevailing within the g1'eat majority of Ge1'man people even during 
the long period of Nazi 1'ule. It is reasonable to assume that mo1'ality of this 
30) R. Lange， Das KontrolIratsgesetz Nr. 10 in Theorie und Praxis， DRZ， 1948， S. 156. 
S閃 theauthor's articJe cited above at 22). 
31) Priedmann， op， cit. p. 458 f. 
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sort， being as the basis of way of action of people， became at the same time 
the standard of people in passively criticizing the Nazi out1ook of the world 
fo1'ced on th巴m，for instance the slogan of “law is law". Therefore， the decision 
of CA Bamberg gave this morality a role to examine the meaning of the Nazi 
laws and informer's action， and to judge their social adaptability， instead 
of natural law. It is actual1y the standard for evaluation as fol1owed by 
such a meaning and function. The conventional morality here has a similar 
character to the consciousness of natural law (das Bewusstsein des naturlichen 
Rechts) emanating from the historical school of law in Germany， or the cons-
cious ness of living law insisted by the legal sociologists， especial1y by E. 
Ehrlich， as fa1' as we are concerned with some socio-moral basis of law 
crystal1ized in the tradition of society and pattern of social action. Assuming 
citizen， public 01' common man in ordinary sense as the main forces for the 
development of history， certainly， itappeals us in many points. Since it 
finds th巴 keyto an understanding the validity of law and fidelity to law in 
legal consciousness of people， mo1'ality of this sort becomes a foundation of 
the socal1ed doct1'ine of acceptance of law (Ane1'kennungstheorie). 
Several di血culties，however， here too prev巴ntus to understand the con-
ventional morality as the unquestionably certain standard for evaluation. 
One of them is that this morality was applied by court on a presumption. 
Certainly， the decision of CA Bamberg was careful1y rested on this morality 
instead of natural law . But the decision may stil seem to rest on a presump-
tion as far as it plac巴da special emphasis on the fact that there were natural1y 
a group of decent conscientious human beings under any circumstances， for 
instance even at the time of Nazi tryanny. If so， the matt巴rswould not have 
been helped， if， instead of applying natural law， courts had applied the conven圃
tional morality. For this morality might have been delimited within the 
meaning and function similar to highe1' law， or natural law， unless it became 
into being empirical1y understandable， accordingly scientifical1y varificable. 
The other di:ficulty lies in a duality emanating from the conventional 
morality. On the one hand， the decision of CA Bamberg seems to favo1' the 
view that the popula1' acceptance of law by means of the conventional morality 
is actual1y relevant to 1'eview t 
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pro白 sas well as the Nazi laws being rested on the popu1ar recognition， was 
able to decide everything in th巴 decisivelyautocratic way.32) Both of them 
are same by the name of popular acceptance of law， but diametrically opposite 
in reality. 
Looking at such a duality of the matters， itis clear that the concept of 
popular law consciousness， notwithstanding being so sweeping， has been 
sterotyped into the idea of popular acceptance of law， consequently has been 
applied as such a master-key in both sides， either in order to justify the Nazi 
po1itical process and Nazi laws， or to criticize them， either to prosecute th巴
Nazi offenders， particular1y informers， or to object this prosecution. So far 
as this predicament is concerned with， itis also hard to accept and apply the 
standard of conventiona1 morality as being a wholly unquestionable one. 
The existing di血cu1tyat present， however， does not mean that we can 
not diminish the di盟cultyeven in the future. It is essential， 1 believe， tofind 
a chain of certain standards which helps to deal with and evaluate the crucial 
part of the problem in the empirical and historical context， by making the 
conventional morality to be a scientifically varificable standard on the one 
hand， by constructing a triad of this morality， pure morality and inner morality 
of law on the other. This idea too， leading beyond the scope of the paper 
here， seems to me to be one of the relevant suggestion included in the 
discussion on the decision of CA Bamberg. 
32) Pappe， op. cit. p. 272. 
